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In November 1974, resp stockholders of petr
Parkland Hosiery Co. brought a class action against petrs, the Company
and 12 of its officers, directors, and stockholders, alleging the violation of various security law provisions in the issuance of a proxy
statement on a proposed merger that was ultimately

comple~ed7

resp

sought damages, the rescision of the merger, ' and other such relief as

gr~-r

bt-c,A

ww oF ~ ~A ~'e. ~"~'ct-.

~
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(

might be granted.

In May of 1976,

befo~e

the above case came up for

trial, the SEC brought an action against petrs in federal DC alleging
identical violations of the security laws and seeking various forms
of equitable relief.

The SEC action came to trial a month later; on

November 9, 1976, the DC, sitting without a jury, issued an opinion

--

finding in favor of the SEC.

Resps immediately moved for summary

judgment in their class action urging collateral estoppel.

Petrs

opposed the motion on the ground that they were entitled to a

~

trial of the issued previously decided without a jury in the SEC suit;
a jury trial had not been possible in the SEC action because of its
equitable nature.
\ ....

The DC [Wyatt, S.D.N.Y.] agreed and denied resps'

motion for summary judgment.

On an interlocutory appeal, the CA 2

reversed and ordered summary judgment to be issued.

The issue presented

by this petn is the same as the question certified to the CA 2:
"Whether the court's findings of fact in a
prior action commenced by the Securities and
Exchange Commission can, by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, be applied to a subsequent
action by a different plaintiff, seeking leqal
and equitable relief, based on the same transactions as was the action commenced by the ,SEC,
when there was no right to a jury trial in that
action?"
2.

r

~

Vl

in

PRIOR DECISIONS:

The collateral effect, if any, of a judgment

an SEC suit on a later related damage action brought by private

plaintiffs has been considered by prior courts.
435 F.2d 59 (1970), cert. denied, 403

u.s.

In Rachal v. Hill,

904 (1971), a panel of the

CA 5 [Gewin, Morgan & Adams, CA 3] held under almost identical facts

- 3 -

that a defendant in a damage action does not "lose his constitutional
right to a trial by jury by estoppel when the issue to be decided has
been adjudicated adversely to him in a prior proceeding at which there
was no right to a trial by jury and his present adversary was not a
party."

Id. at 63.

In reaching this conclusion, theCA 5 was strongly

influenced by the decisions of this Court holding that when an equitable
claim and a legal claim, the resolution of which depend on the determination of a common factual issue, are joined in the same action, the
common issue must be first tried before a jury, even if the equitable
claim was brought first or if the legal claim is merely incidental to
the equitable.
(1959} •

See,

~·

Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500

The CA 5 concluded that the strong interest in preserving the

defendant's right to a jury trial that was demonstrated in these cases
militated against application of collateral estoppel under the circumstances of the case.
While no other CA has had to directly rule on the issue presented
by Rachal and the instant case, several other CAs have cited Rachel
with apparent approval.
504 F.2d 101, 111 n.7

See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States,

(CA 7 1974}; Lynn Carol Fashions,

Print Works co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1184 (CA 3 1972}.

Inc. v. Cranston

The Des have appar-

ently consistently followed theCA 5's decision in Rachal.

See cases

cited on p. 9 of the Petition.
3.

THE DECISION BELOW:

The CA 2 began by noting that, if it

were not for Rachal, collateral estoppel would clearly .apply on the

- 4 -

facts of this case.

The issues were the same and petrs were accorded

a full and fair opportunity to try those issues in the prior proceeding.
Nor would the absence of mutuality of parties prevent the application
of collateral estoppel, in light of Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (}971).

(Petrs do not

challenge this portion of the CA 2's holding.)
Turning to the jury trial issue, the CA 2 explicitly refused to
follow theCA S's decision in Rachal.
the CA 2, was not in point.

Beacon Theatres, in the view of

"If anything, Beacon Theatres implicitly

confirms the long-accepted principle that a non-jury adjudication of
issues asserted in an equitable claim will collaterally estop a later
jury trial of the same issues presented by the same party in a legal
claim.

Had it not been for that basic assumption the Supreme Court

would not have been concerned about the order in which the legal and
equitable claims were to be tried, since the defendant would then have
been guaranteed a jury trial of the counterclaim regardless of the outcome of the equitable claim."

TheCA 2 also cited a long string of

cases for the proposition that, at least where there was mutuality of
parties, the mere fact that a prior proceeding was equitable in nature
has never beenthought to bar application of collateral estoppel or res
judicata.

See p. 7a of the Petition.

In theCA 2's view, more than offsetting the defendants' interest
in a jury trial

(as recognized in Rachal and Beacon Theatres\ were the

policies underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Adherence to

- 5 (

the CA 5 's opinion in Rachal "would violate basic principles of fairness, finality, certainty, economy in utilization of judicial resources,
avoidance of possibly inconsistent results, and achievement of the
'just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' "
~r
Petitioners' prL1cipjA' argument was that historically they would
not have been collaterally estopped under the circumstances of this

-

-

case (since the common law in 1791 did not require mutuality of parties)
and thus, they would have been entitled to a jury trial.
Court's decision in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293

u.s.

Under this

474 (1935), the historic

contours of the common law right to a jury trial must be preserved.
The CA 2 disagreed.

First, such a strict historical approach to inter-

preting the Seventh Amendment had in their view been weakened by this
court's decision in

Ros~

v. Bernhard, 396

u.s.

531 (1970).

Furthermore,

even "a strict historical standard would not mandate a jury retrial
of the present case.

Dimick involved a suit for damages for personal

injuries of the cornmon garden-variety type that had long existed at
common law prior to 1791 and had always been triable by jury.

Moreover,

the pre-1791 law clearly prohibited the Court from increasing a jury
award in such a case.

In the present case, on the other hand, we find

no 18th Century counterpart or analogue to an SEC proceeding for injunctive relief or a stockholders' suit based on an implied right of
action created by antifraud provisions of federal securities laws."
Thus, in the CA 2's view,

it was impossible to determine whether the

common law would have eased collateral estoppel under the circumstances

i

- 6 (

of this case and allowed the entry of summary judgment.
The CA 2 noted finally that, even if under certain circumstances
considerations of fairness would preclude collaterally estopping a
defendant from relitigating issues that had been previously litigated
in a non-jury proceeding, petrs had "made no effort to protect their
right to a jury trial of the damage claims asserted by [resps], either
by seeking to expedite trial of the present action or by requesting
[the judge in the SEC action], in the exercise of his discretion
pursuant to Rule 39(b),

(c), F.R. Civ. P., to order that the issues in

the SEC case be tried by a jury or before an advisory jury."

4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs contend that the CA 2 abridged their

historical right to a jury trial under the circumstances of this case.
Before the demise of the doctrine of mutuality of parties, a jury trial
would clearly have been required.

Modifications in the scope of

collateral estoppel cannot cut back on the right to a jury trial
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.

In addition to being wrong, the

decision of the CA 2 directly conflicts with the decision of another
of
circuit and is/obvious general imp.o rtance.
Petrs also defend their failure to try and preserve their right
to a jury trial until after the SEC action had been completed.

The

damage action could not have been expedited because the parties were
not yet ready for trial.
(.,.,. . ,

The SEC action could not have been deferred

because of the "well-established policy requiring SEC enforcement
actions to be tried without being delayed by private litigation."

See

- 7 (

cases cited at pp. 23-24 of the Petition.

Finally, the DC did not

have the authority to try the SEC action before a jury and the use of
an advisory jury pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 39{c) would not have
satisfied petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
Resps merely echoe the logic of the CA 2.

Resps do not contest

that there is a conflict in the CAs and that the issue presented by
this petn has major ramifications.

Resps do argue that the Court may

wish to wait for a later case in which thepetrs attempted, but were
unable, to either delay the SEC action or expedite the private damage
action, thus eliminating any possible issue of "waiver."
5.
(

DISCUSSION:

The issue presented is not easy.

convinced by petrs "historical" argument.

I am not really

Petrs would not only freeze

the common law rules as to when a jury trial is required, but would
also freeze any rules -- including collateral estoppel -- that might
influence when there is a jury trial.

The question here is not whether

petrs are entitled to a jury determination of any issues presented by
the case, but what issues petrs are free to present in light of the
previous litigation.
On the other hand, however, petrs would have been entitled to a
jury trial if the SEC action had not intervened.

Despite the impli-

cations of the CA 2 to the contrary, there would appear to have been
little petrs could have done to prevent the SEC action from intervening
(

or otherwise preserve their right to a jury trial.

Petrs' loss of

their right to a jury trial is obviously troubling given its importance
in the scheme of the Seventh Amendment.

-

8 -

Given the conflict in the CAs, and the importance of the issue,
this might well be a grant.
There is a response.
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Justice Powell

Re:

Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., et al. v. Shore,

certiorari to the CA2 (Mansfield, Timbers, Dooling (of
E.D.N.Y. by designation))
I.

FACTS
In October 1974 petitioner Parklane effected a merger

that converted it into a privately owned company controlled in
part by petitioner Somekh.

In order to obtain the

shareholders' approval for this merger, the officers of the
company issued a proxy statement describing the terms of the

2.

transaction and advising the shareholders of a meeting that
would be held on October 14 to consider the merger proposal.
After the merger was consummated, one of Parklane's former
minority shareholders, the respondent, brought a class action

--

suit under the Securities and Exchange Act against Parklane and
twelve of its officers, directors, and shareholders in the

S.D.N.Y., alleging that the 1974 proxy statement had been false
and misleading in three respects.

The complaint asked for

damages, rescission of the merger, and costs.

~

56 ~11 ~~dJ-1..~

~ ~~

In May 1976, while the petitioners and respondent were
...._,_

against Parklane in the S.D.N.Y.

,__

..........

The Commission __,
made

es ~entially th ~me al ~ ns that the respondent had made

~~~ in
~

-

in the middle of discovery, the SEC sought an injunction

his complaint.

After a four day trial at which the

petitioners appeared as defendants and actively participated,
the district court ruled for the SEC, finding that the proxy
statement had failed to make adequate disclosure with respect
to each of the three subjects alleged.

Moreover, the court

found these nondisclosures to have been material.

The second

circuit affirmed.
~

4~

~~

1

~-

~· ~

The respondent then moved for partial summary judgment
in his ongoing private action against Parklane and its
officers.

The respondent assserted that the rulings of the

~-~ ~t in the SEC action collaterally estopped the petitioners
~~~om relitigating those issues. Relying on Rachal v. Hill, 435
·~ ~2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), the district court denied the motion,

7- ~~ that no collateral estoppel effect could
~
~~GD~~~prior action, as the petitioners
~ ~ll~rg~e

those issues to a jury.

be given the
had not been

3.
After certification of an interlocutory appeal under
28 U.S.C. §1292(b), the second circuit reversed the district

~11 ~~

~~~

~~

court.

The court stated that equity judgments have long been

taken to preclude retrial of certain issues.

~-~~~e~-os torpl'pgehlt is~~t ~~dds
~~ ~-

L

r1
nv0 ~~
~

with

~v-

amendment, as there is

to have a jury Jdecide questions with respect to which
there is no disputed isk ue of fact; where a party has had a

full and fair

oppor~unity

~ ~~0 ~proceeding, there remains
~
jury's consideration.
~~~

the-seven~

Such collateral

to litigate an issue in an equity
no disputed issue of fact for the

The court recognized that its ruling was directly ~
contrary to the fifth circuit's decision
F.2d 59 (1970).

i~Rachal

v. Hill, 4) 5

The court found the reliance in Rachal on this

Court's decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
500 (1959) misplaced.

u.s.

In Beacon Theatres the Court ruled that

when a single action involves questions for a jury and
questions for the court, the court must take pains that the
former are decided first, so as not to interfere with the
parties' seventh amendment right to a jury trial.

The second

circuit opined that implicit in Beacon Theatres was the maxim
that if a question is decided by a judge, collateral estoppel
will preclude future consideration of that issue by a jury.
Finally, although the court admitted that courts
sometimes had determined the scope of the seventh amendment by
reference to the right to jury trial as of 1791, the court
found such reference unhelpful here.

Thus, it is not apparent

what courts of law in 1791 would have done with a judgment
resulting from an SEC enforcement action.

Similarly, it is

impossible to discern how courts of law would have reacted if

-

4.
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel had been abandoned.
li.

CONTENTIONS
The petitioners make four basic claims.

First, they

argue that insofar as collateral estoppel may limit the issues
presented to a jury, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applied must be that in force in 1791--the time of the
enactment of the seventh amendment.

Second, they argue that

the second circuit here misinterpreted this Court's ruling in
Beacon Theatres.

Third,
they argue that, quite apart from
__,

constitutional requirements, collateral estoppel should not be
applied in cases such as the one at hand because "justice and
equity" are at odds with depriving individuals such as the
petitioners of their opportunity to be heard by a jury.
Finally, the petitioners contend that the second circuit was
mistaken in suggesting that they had not done everything
practicable to secure a jury ruling in their case.
The respondents dispute each of the petitioners'
contentions.

Most important, they argue that the courts always

have been willing to make accomodation under the seventh
amendment for changes in procedure, and that the shift away
from the mutuality requirement in collateral estoppel should be
no exception /
The SG has filed an amicus brief on behalf of the SEC.
The Commission in concerned with the possible effect this case
might have on its enforcement proceedings.

The SG argues that

under present collateral estoppel doctrine the petitioners
would be precluded from relitigating issues decided against it
in the SEC action.

Thus, the only question is whether the

seventh amendment requires deviation from the normal doctrine

5.
of collateral estoppel.

In 1791 a ruling in equity could estop

questions presented at law.

That mutuality of estoppel was

required in 1791 is irrelevant, as the courts consistently have
allowed the adoption of modern procedural rules even when it
means taking issues away from the jury.
United States, 319

u.s.

372, 390-91

See, e.g., Galloway v.

(1943)(upholding the

granting of summary judgments and directed verdicts).
Finally, however, the government takes issue with the second
circuit's intimation that it would have been appropriate for
the district court that heard the SEC enforcement action to
stay the injunctive proceedings in order to afford the
petitioners time to go to trial with their action at law.

The

SG argues that the the efficacy of SEC enforcement actions
would be curtailed sharply if they were delayed for long
periods of time.

The~shinton
brief amicus.

Legal Foundation (WLF) also has filed a

WLF argues that the second circuit's ruling here

places businesses in a difficult dilemma:

They either can

~

litigate claims raised by government agencies in enforcement
actions (as Parklane did here) and risk huge liability through
the action of collateral estoppel in subsequent private class
action suits, or they can settle the government action despite
weaknesses in the government's case.

Thus, WLF contends that

the true effect of the ruling below will be the coercion o
settlements favorable to the government in future enforcement
actions.

Moreover. WLF is concerned that the doctrine

announced here may extend as well to afford collateral estoppel
effect to quasi-adjuciations by federal agencies (e.g. the
FTC).

6.
III.
A.

DISCUSSION
Arguments for Reversal

I see two strong arguments for reversal of the second
circuit here:

------~-----------------

(1) application of collateral estoppel in cases

such as this is directly contrary to the purpose of the seventh
amendment--preservation of the right to jury trial as it
existed in 1791; and (2) quite apart from any constitutional
concerns, the second circuit's ruling interferes with the
substantial federal policy in favor of jury trials.
1.

History

The seventh amendment provides that,
[i]n suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved ••••
Because the constitutional language speaks of "preserving" the
right to a jury trial, the courts have looked to the scope of
the right to jury trial in 1791

(the year the seventh amendment

was adopted) in determining the scope of the present-day right.
See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974);
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935)("In order to
ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment,
resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law
established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional
provision in 1791").
Whether courts of law would give collateral estoppel
effect to judgments of courts of equity in 1791 may be open to
question.

It is certain, however, that in 1791 neither party

__:__.-----------

could use a prior judgment as determinative of an issue in a
second action unless both parties were bound by the prior
judgment; this doctrine was known as "mutuality of estoppel."

7.
Resp here was not a party to the SEC enforcement action against
petrs, and therefore could not have been bound by an adverse
judgment in the first action.

Thus, in 1791 resp could not

have invoked collateral estoppel in the second, private action,
and petrs therefore would have had the right to present to the
jury each of the issues already litigated to the court in the
prior action.

In this way, the second circuit by its ruling

--

here has deprived petrs of a right to jury trial that it would
....

~----

have had at common law in 1791, and the ruling therefore is at
odds with the seventh amendment.
2.

Policy

A second argument for reversal of the second circuit
is based

favoring jury trials in civil

cases, rather than on the seventh amendment right to such
trials.

in ~yrd

The Court recognized this substantial federal interest
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356

U.S. 525 (1958).

Byrd was a diversity action in which the

defendant posed an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's tort
action which required a determination whether the plaintiff was
a statutory employee under South Carolina law.

South Carolina

courts had ruled that this question was one for the court to
decide, rather than the jury.

Although the Court admitted that

trial to the court rather than to a jury could affect the
outcome of the suit, it concluded that the federal district
court should allow the jury to decide whether the plaintiff was
a statutory employee.

The Court ruled that the "federal policy

favoring jury determinations" should take precedence over the
normal rule under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

u.s.

64 (1938)

that state law govern questions that are likely to affect the

8.
outcome of a diversity action.

Byrd, therefore, demonstrates

that there is a strong federal policy interest in allowing
parties in federal courts to present their claims to juries.
In discarding the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel,

....___,___...__

------~ .

the courts have not ruled that prior judgments invariably can
be asserted against parties to the first suit.
courts have

indic~ed

Rather, the

that whether collateral estoppel applies

v

must depend on a "sense of justice and equity."

Blonder-Tongue

Laboratories, In. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402

u.s.

313, 334 (1971).

See also,

Berner v. British

Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir.
1965)(refusing to apply collateral estoppel where the result
would be "unfair").

Moreover, there has been particular

concern over the fairness of applying non-mutual collateral
estoppel

"offensively"-~that

is, where, as here, the party

against whom the estoppel is asserted was a losing defendant in
the first action.

See Currie, Civil Procedure:

Brews, 53 Calif.L.Rev. 25, 37 (1965).

The Tempest

One factor that should

be taken into account in determining the fairness of non-mutual
collateral estoppel is the federal policy expressed in Byrd of
allowing federal parties to present their claims to a jury.
Thus, even if the seventh amendment does not forbid collateral
estoppel of issues determined at a prior equitable action,
collateral estoppel nonetheless is improper because it would
impinge on a fundamental federal policy.

Indeed, this is

precisely the conclusion of one lower federal court.

See

McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 393 F.Supp. 256, 258
(C.D.Cal. 1975).

9.
I can see two main arguments for affirmance:

( 1)

'

allowing relitigation of issues determined by a court is
wasteful; and (2) fairness does not require that a party have a
chance to litigate a second time an issue he already has had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate.
1.

Policy Behind Collateral Estoppel

Perhaps the most important policy underlying
collateral estoppel is judicial economy.

See Semmel,

Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68
Colum.L.Rev. 1457 (1968).

This interest is strongly implicated

when a court in an SEC enforcement action has determined issues
adverse to the defendant, who subsequently is sued by a private
plaintiff.

Thus, it would be a waste of scarce judicial

resources to allow defendants such as petrs here to obtain a
second trial on issues already finally decided.

See Note, The

Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litigation:
Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial,
43 Chi.L.Rev. 338 (1976).

The waste is particularly acute in

cases such as the one at bar, where complex factual situations
often make for long and complicated trials.
2.

Fairness

There is no reason not to estop collaterally petrs
from relitigating the issues decided in the SEC enforcement
action.

Thus, petrs were aware of the ongoing suit for damages

brought against them by resps when they were litigating the SEC
action; there is no danger, therefore, that petrs did not fully
litigate the first action because they were unaware of its
possible ramifications.

Moreover, the SEC action was important

enough in its own right to remove any danger that petrs would

10 •

take it lightly.
'

Some commentators have expressed concern at the
prospect of plaintiffs "sitting on the sidelines," hoping to be
able to use a favorable judgment, while knowing that an
unfavorable judgment will not be used against them.
Semmel, supra, at 1473.

See

There is no danger of that here,

however, as resps had no choice but to stay out of the SEC
action--they could not have intervened even if they had so
desired
C.

My Analysis {
1.

~~}

History

Although I have done no original historical research,
I am persuaded from that of others that in 1791 judgments of
equity courts were given collateral estoppel effect by courts
of law, even though this meant that some issues were not
presented to the jury that otherwise would be.

In Shapiro &

Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases:

A

Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 442 (1971) the
authors found indications in several English and American
treatises and cases supporting this view.

Moreover, the one

law clerk this year trained in legal history (Jack Pratt from
the Chief Justice's chambers) tells me that on the whole he is
persuaded by the work of Shapiro and Coquillette.

Finally, it

v

appears that the Court has assumed that equitable judgments can
estop the relitigation of issues in subsequent legal actions.
See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337-38 (1966).
The historical question, therefore, is whether
collateral estoppel effect should be given the equitable
judgment even in the absence of mutuality of the parties.

To

11•

me it is not enough to say that, if this action had arisen in
1791, then Parklane would have been allowed to present its case
to a jury.

Such a strict, limited view of the historical

limitations of the seventh amendment is simply impossible to
apply in most cases; there have been too many changes in the
law since 1791 and too many situations have arisen that were
beyond the wildest dreams of the Framers of that constitutional
provision.

Thus, I believe that the question more properly

stated is whether allowing collateral estoppel in the absence
of mutuality affects "the basic institution of jury trial
in ••• its most fundamental elements."
States, 319

u.s.

372, 392 (1943).

Galloway v.

Uni~ed

I believe it does not:

The

problem perceived with non-mutual estoppel in the eighteenth
century was not that it would interfere with the right to jury
trial, but rather that it was unfair that a party could
benefit, but not lose, by the judgment in a prior action.

See

Shapiro & Coquillette, supra.
There is a second reason why I am reluctant to
overrule the second circuit's ruling here on the basis of
history:

The task of interpreting the seventh amendment in

light of what lawyers two hundred years ago would think of
procedural innovations is too difficult and dangerous to
produce results with which one is entirely comfortable.

Thus,

others who have attempted the job have observed that there are
few reported decisions concerning the scope of the right to
jury trial in 1791, and the procedures varied substantially
among the states.

See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra.

Indeed,

this Court has noted that interpreting the seventh amendment
leads to an "extensive and possibly abstruse historical

1 2.

inquiry."

Ross v. Bernhard, 396

u.s.

531, 538 n.10 (1970).

Last, I must confess to some skepticism concerning the
pertinence of a strict historical analysis of the right to jury
trial in the eighteenth century.

The world--and particularly

the world of civil procedure--has changed so much in the last
two hundred years that I question whether we even can ask
sensibly what eightenth century lawyers would have done in a
modern context.

My confessed bias, therefore, is to adhere

only to the basic "law/equity" distinction present in 1791;
beyond that I would seek to formulate a rule that makes sense,
absent some overwhelming historical evidence to the contrary.
2.

Collateral Estoppel vs. Seventh Amendment

The question, therefore, is whether the interest in
affording people an opportunity to present their case to a jury
outweighs the interests protected by collateral estoppel--in
particular, the promotion of judicial economy. Contrary to what
both petrs and resp suggest, I do not think Beacon Theatres
answers this question.

In Beacon, as here, the Court was

confronted with a conflict between the right to jury trial and
the operation of collateral estoppel.

To resolve this

conflict, the Court could have compromised the right to jury
trial by saying that the trial court could decide the equitable
issues first and apply collateral estoppel to avoid the jury's
reconsideration of common issues; alternatively, the Court
could havP compromised the exercise of collateral estoppel by
saying that the trial court could determine equitable issues
first but could not apply collateral estoppel to take common
issues away from the jury.

Rather than choose either of these

extremes, however, the Court determined that collateral

1 3.
estoppel should apply, but that the trial court had to preserve

the right to jury trial by submitting common issues to the jury
first.

ZM--~~~

In this way the CourtAavoided the direct clash between

the seventh amendment and collateral estoppel.

(This is the

source of the confusion between the second and fifth circuits:
The former seized upon the deference shown collateral estoppel
in Beacon Theatres; the latter seized upon the deference shown
the right to jury trial--both courts were, in a sense, right.)
To my mind, the interests promoted by collateral
estoppel outweigh the interest in trial to a jury in civil
cases.

The efficiency of deciding issues once, where it is

fair to do so, is apparent and results in substantial savings
to the judicial system.

On the other hand, the courts in other

contexts have not hesitated to take away from defendants their
right to trial by a jury of some issues.

Thus, before merger

of law and equity, it appears that plaintiffs were given
absolute discretion to sue first in equity and, if successful,
subsequently bring an action at law involving the same claims.
See Comment, 40 Cin.L.Rev. 373 (1971).

If such a practice was

consistent with the protection of the seventh amendment right
to jury trial, then it is hard to understand why any
substantial constitutional interest is implicated in the case
at hand.
Accordingly, I would conclude that history is
uninformative and may fairly be read to be consistent with the
decision below.

Moreover, apart from history, the decision

below is justified, as the interests protected by a consistent
collateral estoppel doctrine override any interest in trial of
issues to a jury when a party already has had a full and fair

1 4.

opportunity to litigate those issues.
3.

Policy

Having concluded that the seventh amendment does not
preclude application of collateral estoppel here, I must
confess that I nonetheless am vaguely troubled by the possible
ramifications of the ruling below.

I believe, however, that my

concern has little to do with the right to jury trial.

Rather,

I fear that exorbitant liabilities will now be imposed on
defendants to SEC (and other government) actions because class
action plaintiffs will be able to gain a "free ride" following
a successful government enforcement suit.

If this liabilty

were truly imposed to recompense plaintiffs for actual loss,
perhaps I would not be disturbed.

A substantial portion of' the

liability imposed under the antitrust and securities laws,
however, is meant to encourage "private attorneys general":
such private enforcement is entirely inappropriate on the heels
of a government enforcement action.

This danger, of course, is

present whether a jury trial is involved or not: it is inherent
in use of non-mutual collateral estoppel "offensively" (that
is, against an unsuccessful defendant in the first action).*
As I have noted, courts and commentators have dealt
with this problem in the past, usually when there are many
*/Similarly, amicus WLF's concern that the second circuit's
.....

ruling here will coerce settlements has nothing to do with jury
trials. Whenever collateral estoppel effect is given to a
judgment, that judgment takes on added importance and the
incentive to settle a weak case is thereby increased.

15.

potential plaintiffs and a single defendant (as, for example,
in an air disaster).

Commentators have suggested that in such

situations collateral estoppel should not be applied at all,
see Semmel, supra, or that it should not be applied
"offensively," see, Currie, supra.

The courts, however, have

been content to include a caveat that collateral estoppel in
such situations should be applied only when it is fair to do
so.

See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific

Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).

Perhaps this will

be enough to avoid draconian uses of the power given private
plaintiffs by the second circuit here.
*****
In sum, I believe there

i~o

seventh amendment difficulty with

giving collateral estoppel effect to prior government
enforcement actions in subsequent private actions for damages.
Although I am somewhat concerned over the possible
ramifications of such a use of collateral estoppel, this
concern sterns from the present doctrine of collateral estoppel-not from a concern over the use of juries.

Moreover, it may be

that present safeguards are sufficient to protect defendants
from unfair uses of collateral estoppel.**
10/27/78

David

**/The second circuit's reference in its opinion to the
possibility of staying future SEC enforcement actions in cases
such as this pertains to the question of waiver of the seventh
amendment right to trial by jury, should it exist. As I
believe there is no such right, there is no need for the Court
to consider the propriety of this dictum.
In any event, if
trial courts in the future follow the suggestion of the second
circuit and improperly stay SEC actions, the Court may review
the question on appeal from those stays; there is no need to
reach out and reverse dictum here •
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Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., On Writ of Certiorari to
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v.
of Appeals for the Second
Leo M . Shore.
Circuit.
[December - , 1978,]

MR. JusTICJ<j STEWART deliver<'d the opinion of the Court.
This case presents tlw question whether a party who has
had issues of fact adjudicated advPrsely to it in an equitable
nction may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same
issues bC'fore a jury in a subs<'quent legal action with a new
party.
The respondent brought this stockholder's class action
against the petitioners in a federal district court. The complaint alleged that the petitiotwrs, Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. (Parklane) and 12 of its officers. directors. and
stockholders. had issued a mat<'rially false and misle3.(Jing
proxy statRme11t in comH'ction with a merger. 1 The proxy
statement. according to th<' complaint. had violated~~ 14 (a),
10 (b). and 20 (a) of tlw Aeruriti<'s Exchange Act. of 1934.
48 Stat. 8~)5. 891. 800. as anwnded. 15 F. S. C. ~~ 78n (a).
78.! (b), and 78t (a), as well as various rules and regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
1
Thr amrndrd complaint allr~l'd that tiH' prox~· ~faf('llH'Ilt that had
IH'('JJ i~surd to 1hr ~foekho ldrr~ wa~ fal~r :tnd mi ~ lrndin11: hre:111~r it fni!Pd
to di~c·los<' : (J) thnt thr Prr~idrnf of P:trklnnr would finnnri:tll.\· brn('fif a~
n rr~ulf of thP compan~ · ,going prwafr : (:!) cc•rfain ongoing nrgofiation~
that eould ha,·r rrsultc·d in finarH·i:tl lwnd1t to Parklnne, :1nd (~) that
thr apprai:<nl uf fhf' fair ntlue of P:nklanc· ~rock wa ..; ha~rd on in:<nllicic•nt
informal ron t.o hr accurate.
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(SEC). The complaint sought damages, recission of the
merger, and r<"covery of costs.
Before this action came to trial, the SEC filed suit against
the same defendants in a federal district court, a::Ileging that
the proxy statement that had been issued by Parklane was
materially false and misleading in essentially the same
respects as those that had bee11 alleged in the respondent's
complaint. Injunctive relief was requested. After a fourday trial, the District Court found that the proxy statement
was materially~ 1msleailing in tlie respects alleg~d,
and enterea a aeclaratory JUdgment to that effect. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422'
F. Supp. 477. The Court of Appeals for the Second C'ircuit
affirmed this judgment. 558 F. 2d 1083.
Th<' respondent in the present case then moved for partial
summary judgment against the petitiouers. asserting that the
petitioners wer<' collatRrally Pstopped from relitigating the
issues that had been r<'solved against them iu the action
brought by the SEC. 2 ThP District Court denied the motion
on the ground that such an application of collatRral estoppel
would deny the petition('J'S thPir Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second C'ircuit
reversed. holding that a party who has had issues of fact determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate
in a nonj ury trial is collaterally Pstopped from obtaining a
subsequent jury trial of these same issuPs of fact. 565 F. 2d
815. The appellate court concluded that "the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to jury trial only with respect
2 A J>rivatr plaint itT in an ac-tion undPr thr prox~· rulp:; i8 not Pntit!Pd
to rPiiPf ~imp!~· by dPmonstrating th:tt the proxy solicitation wns materially
fa]:;p and mi~leading. Thr plaintiff must :d;;o ~how that hr was injurPd and
prOV(' unmnges . Mills \'. Electl·ir· Auto-Lite, 396 11. S. :li5, :386-:390.
Smc<' the SEC aet ion wa:s limit Pel to a ddermination of whC'thrr tlw proxy
stntemPnt~ <"OiltainPcl mah' riall~ · false nncl misle::din11: :statement:;, th~·
rpsponclrnt roJl(•eciPd that hP would still hn ve to prove thcs«> otlwr ele-.
mrnt s of his prima fnci<' ra~<' in thr private aetion .
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to issues of fact, [and] once those issues have been fully and
fairly adjudicated in a prior proceeding, uothing remains for
trial, either with or without a. jury." !d., at 819. Because of
U. S. - .
an intercircuit conflict,a we granted certiora.ri. -

I
The threshold question to be considered is whether, quite
apart from the right to a. jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the petitioners can bf' precluded from relitigating facts
resolved adversely to them in a prior equitable proceeding
with a.nother pa.rty under the general law of collateral estQPpel. Specifically, we must determine whether a litigant who
;as not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that
judgment "offeJlsively'' to pn'vent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding. 4
A

Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata,r.·
The position of !IJP Court of Apprub for thr SPcond Circuit i;,; in conHict. with t hnt takrn b~· thr Court of Appmli:i for the Fifth Circ·uit in
Rachal , .. //ill. -l-35 F . 2cl 59.
1
' In thi~ contrxt, offen;;iv<' u;,;r of collntpral rstoppel occur" when the
_plaintiff ~l'rk:-: to foreclose the defendant from litigating an i~sue the
defendant haR prrviously litigated un::;urces~fully in an action with anotheF
party. Drfrn~ivr u:;r occur~ when a clefcnclant SE:'eks to prevent a. plaintiff from a~:;erting a claim the pbintiff has previously litigated and lost
against a not hrr defrnclant.
r. Unde-•r thr doctrine of rr:; judicata, a juclgmrnt on the merit:; iu a prior
suit bar~ n "rcond suit involving thP ~anw parties or tht'ir privie:; basref
on the• HHiliP <'HIN' of net ion. Under t hl' cloct rinr of colbteral estoppel,
on thr other hand, thr ~f'cond aetion is upon n cliti'erf'nt cau:;e of action
and the• judgnwnt. in thr prior ~nit prrdude,; rrlitigation of i~suei:i actually
litigated :mel nece.~sar~ · to the outcomr l>f the first action . lB . .T. Moore,
Fcclernl Practice 1T 0.405!11, at R22-824 (2cl rd. 1974); e. g., Lawlor v.
Natirmal Screen Serv. Corp .. 349 U.S. a22, ;3:26 (1955); Commissioner v·.
Sw111e11. :~:3:~ P. 1::1. 591, .597 (194Fl); Cron!U'ell "· Count11 of .Sac, 94 U.s·.
~51, !352-:35!3 (181()).
3
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has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden
of relitigating an idPntical issu~ with the same party or his
privy and of promoting .i udicial economy by preventing need~
less litigation. Blonder- 'l'ongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313. 328-329. Until
relatively recently, however. the scope of collateral estoppel
was limited by the doctrine of mutuality of parties. Under
this mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a prior judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were
bound by the judgment.n Based on the premise that it is
somehow unfair to allow a party to use a prior judgment
when he himself would not be so bound, 7 the mutuality
requirement provided a party who had litigated and lost in a
previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues
with new parties.
By failing to recognize the obvious difference in position \
between a party who has never litigated an issue and one who
has fu]]y litigated and lost. the mutuality requirement was
criticized almost from its inception. 8 Recognizing the validity

a., HigeiO'Il' Y. Old Domiu·ion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 127 ("It
a. principle of general elementary law that, estoppel of a judgment, must,
be mutual."): Buckelfl' Puwder C'o. \'.E. l. du Punt de NPnww·s Powder
Co., 248 U. S. 53, 6:1; Re,.;tutcmrnt of Judgments§ 93 (1942).
7 It is a ,·iolat ion of due> proce~,; for a jndgmeht to be binding on a litignnt who was uoi a part.'· nor a Jlri,·)· and thert'fore ha,.; JHw~>r had an
opportunity to lw heard. BlondN-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation. 402 U. S. 313, 329; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S.
:~2, 40.
8 This rrit icbm wa~ ~ummariz<'d in t.hr Court's opinion in Blonder'l'ongue Laboratories. hu·. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S.
313, :t22-:3:27 . The opinion of Ju~ticc Traynor for a unanimous Cabfornia
Supreme Comt h1 Bemlwrd v. Bank of .4merica Nat. 'f'r·ust· & Savings
.4.~sll .. 19 Cal. 2d S07 , 812. 1:22 P . 2d 89:.?, 895 (1942), madr the point
: Hlrcinclly :
•· xo sati8fartory rationaliza1ion has brcn advanced for a rf'f]uin•mrni of
mutunllty . Ju~1 why a party who wn:; not, bound by a pn'viou~ action
Hhould be precluded from a::;:,;erting it a;; rPs judicata again,;t a pnrty wlm
wa,.; bound by 1t is diffieult to comprehend."
G E.

i~
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of this criticism, the Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. U11iversity of Illinois Founda,tion, supra, abandoned the
mutuality requirement, at least in cases where a pa.t euteo
seeks to reiTtigate tfi'e validity of a patent after a federal court
in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid." The
"broader question" before the Court, however, was "whether
it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full
and fair opportunity for judicial rrsolution of the same issue."
!d., at 328. The Court stro11gly suggested a negative answer
to that question:
11
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the
mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete
def<"nse on thr merits to a claim which the plaintiff has
fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is au arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without
contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but
unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit,
the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative uses-productive or otherwise-to relitigation of a
decided issue. And, still assumiug that the issue was
resolved correctly in the first suit. there is reason to be
concerned about the plaintiff's allocation of resources.
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long
as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects
either the aura of the gaming table or 'a lack of discipline
and of disinterestedness on thr part of the lower courts,
hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rulrs of procedure.' Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U. S.
180, 185 (1952) . Although neither judges, the parties,.
n ln Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U . S. 63R, th<> Court. had held that a determmation of pa\(•nt mvalidity m a prior aetwn doe,; not bar a plaintiff from
rrlitJgating th<> Yalidity of a patent in a subsequent action a different
def('lldaut . Tl11~ holding of the Tripll'tt ra~c was explicitly overn1led in

the Blo11der-Tougne Laboratories

ca~c.
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nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases,
the requirement of determining wheth{'r the party against
whom a.u estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard." 402
U. S., at 329.10
B
The BJ2.ru.£er-Tongue case involved defensive use of collateral estoppel-a plai11tTif was estopped from asserting a
claim ffiat the plaintiff hall previously litigated and lost
against another defendant. The present case, by contrast,
involves offensive use of collaterR-1 estoppel-a plaintiff is
seeking to estop a defewia.nt from relitigating the issues which
the def{'ndant previously litiga.tecl and lost against another
plaintiff. In both the offensive and defensive use situations,
the party ag;it1st whom estoppel 1s asserted has litigated and
lost in an earlier actiOn. Nevertheless, several reasons have
been aa~d why the two situa.tions should be treated
differently. 11
First, offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote
judicial eco11omy in the same manner as defensive use does.;
Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from
10 The Court abo emphaHized thnt
relitigation of issues previously
adjuclicntrd is particularly wnsteful in patent cwsl's because of their staggrring Pxprnsr and typical length. 402 U. S., at 334, 348. Under the
doctrine of mutualit~· of partir~ nn al!Pged infringN might find it cheaper
to pny royaltil'S than to challeng<' a patent that. had bec·n declared invalid
in a prior ::mit, since the holder of the patent i~ entitled to a statutory
prpsumpt 1011 of vnlidit~· . I d., at 3:38.
11 Yarious commrntatorH have expre;;~ed re~rrvations regarding the applirntion of otJen;;ivr collatrral CHtoppel. B. Currir, :\Iutuality of Estoppel:
Limit;; of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. H<•v. 281 (1957); SPmmel,
CollatPral E:,;topp<'l, :'l·lutuality nnd .Joinder of Partir:;, 6R Colum. L. Rev.
1-+57 (196~) : Not<', Thr Impact~ of Defen~ivp and Offrnsivc A~Hertion of
C'ollatPral E;;topprl b.\' a :\onpHrty, ;)5 nco . Wa::;h. L. HPv. 1010 (1967).·
Prof<'~~or CuiTH' later 1<'111pPred hi:,; rP~l·rvationH.
H. Currie, Civil Procedure : The TPinJW~t BrPwtS, 53 Calif. L. Rrv. 25 (1965) .
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relitigating identical issues by merely "switehing adversaries."
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19
Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P. 2d 892, 895 (1942).'~ Thus defensive
collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join
all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Offensive use of collateral estoppel. on the other hand, creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to
rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not
be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in
the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in
a favorable judgment. E. g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 762. 767-768, 327 P. 2cl 111, 115 (1968); Reardon v.
Allen, 88 N. ·J. Super. 560. 571-572, 213 A. 2d 26, 32 (1965).
Thus offensiye use of col)ateral estoppel will likely increase
rather trian decrease the total amount of litigation. since
p;tentiaf J)faiiJtii'fs will have everything to gain and nothing
to lose by not intervening in the first action. 13
A second argument against offen~ive use of collateral estoppel is that it may be unfair to a defendant. If a defendant
in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he
may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly
if future suits are not forseeable. Evergreens Y. 1\runan, 141
F. 2d 927, 929; cf. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F. 2d 532 (application of offensive collateral estoppel
denied where defendant did not appeal an adverse judgment
awarding damages of $35,000 and defendant was later sued for
over $7 million). Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may
also be unfair to a defendant if the judgment relied upon as a
1

Under th<' rnut unlit~· I'<'Qilin•mrnt, n phintiff could accomplish this
;:m<·P h<' would not han! h<'l'll bound by t.hc judgment ha.d the
origmal dd'Pndnnt won .
1 '1 Thr Re~tate'nH'IIt (Second) of .Judgment~ (TPnt. Draft ~o. 2, 19i5)
~~ (:3), JH'ovicfp,., that app!trntwn of eollatrral &~topprl ma.'' bP dPniPd iF
thr party :lS,.,('rt Ill~ 1t "could lwv<' cffrctPd joinder in the fir~t action
bet W<'Cil hllll~<'lf and hi,- prP:>cnt advrr:-;ary"
tc~ult

~

I
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basis for the Pstoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more
previous judgments in favor of the defendant. 14 Still another/
situation where it might be unfair to apply offensive estoppel
is where thP second action affords the defendant procedural
opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily
cause a different result. 1
ij

c

We have concluded that the preferable approach for dea.ling
with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude
the use of ofl"ensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts
broad discretion to determine when it should be applied. 10
11 In Profe>i~or Currie's familiar example, a railroad colli,;ion injure~
50 pn>isenger~ all of whom bring sepamte action:; against the railroad.
After the railroHd win,; thr fir~t 25 Huits, [L plaintiff wins in suit 26.
Profe~~or C'urrir argue:-: that offrmsivr u:sc of collateral estoppel should not
be appli(•d ~o as to nllow plaintiff::; 27 through 50 automatically to recover.
B. Curm, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limit.s of tlw Bernhard Doctrine, 9
Stan. L. Hev. 281, 304 (1957). See Restatement (Second) of Judgments
(Trntative Draft No.2, 1975) § 8R (4).
·1r, If, for rxumpl€·, thr defendant in the fir~:;t. action was forced to defend
in an inconvenient forum and thert>forr was unable to engage in full scale
disco\·rr~· or call wittte~;o;t>B, applirat ion of offensive collateral estoppel may
be unwarranted. lndcecl, diffPrPnres in available procedureH may sometim€'::5 justif\ not allowing :t prior judgment. to have estoppel effect in a
sub~rqurnt nrtion rvt>n brtwrpn the s:une parties, or where defen£ive
e>itoppel i3 a~srrtt>d ngain~t a plaintiff who hn~ litigated and lo;,;t. ThP
problem of unfnirnel:'~ is pariiculurly acute in case:; of offensiw estoppel,
however, becauRc thr defPndant against whom estopp('[ is assrrted typically
w1ll not haYe cho:sen the forum in thr fir.-·t action. SeE' Restatement
(Srcontl) of .Judgments (Trntative Draft No. 2, 1975) § &S (2) and
Commpnt d.
tu Thi,; i~
r::;srntiall~· the approach of the Re;;tatement (Second) of
.Judgment~ (Trnt. Draft ~o. 2, 197.5) § SH, which n·<·ogniz<•:s that "the
di"tinct trend if not the clrar weight of n·c<·nt authority i~ to thr effect
that then' i:-. no intrin:sir diffrn·ncl' bet ween ·offpn~ive' a~ di,;tinct from
'dd'en6w' is~uP preclusion. nlthough a ~trunger Hhowing that thr prior·
opportuuit~· wa~ adequate may be rl'quirt>d in the former situation th1111 ·
thr later.'' RPportcr':; Kote, at \l9 .
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The

a plaintiff
as1 y ave joined in the ea.rlier action or where, either
for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a
trial judge should not allow the use of ofl'ensive collateral
estoppel.
In the present case, however, none of the circumstauces
that might justify reluctance to allow the offensive use of
collateral estoppel is present. The application of ofl'ensive
collateral estoP}wl will not here reward a private plaintifl' who
could have joined in the previous action, since the respondent
could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the
SEC even had he so desired. 11 Similarly, there is no unfairness to the petitioners in applying offensive collateral estoppel
in this case. First, in light of the serious allegations made in
the SEC's complaint against the petitioners, as well as the
foreseeability of subsequent private suits that typically follow
a successful government judgment, the petitioners had every
incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and vigorously. 18
Second. the judgment in the .Commission a.ction was not
incousistent with any previous decision. Finally, there will
in the respondent's action be no p'rocedura.l opportuuities
availablf' to the petitioner that were unavailable in the first
11

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Eve1'est Management Corp.,

475 F. 2d 12:{6, 1240 ("thr complicating effect of the additional i&mes and
thr additional partie~ outwei!rhi' an~· advantage of a ~inglr disposition of
the common i~sue~ .") \-[orrover, consolidation of a private action with
one hrought b~· the SEC Without 1ts consent is prohibited by statute.
15 11 . S.C. 7~ti (g) .
1
~ After n four-day trial in which tlw petitioners had every opportunity
to prt>:srn1 rvidrncc and eall witne~s~'~, the District Court held for the
SEC. The peti11oners thrn appealrd to the Court of Appeals for the.
Second Circuit, which atfirmed thr judgment against them. Moreover,
the prtitioners wen' ah·ead~· :1ware of the action brought by the rP>~pond-·
rut, ~i.ocP it hnd commeuced. before the filing of the SEC artion.
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action of a kind that might be likely to cause a different
result. 10
·we conclude, therefore. that nonP of the considerations that
\vouid justify a refusal to allow the usc of offensive collateral
estoppel is pr<'sent in this case. Since the petitioners received
a "full and fair" opportunity to litigatf' tlwir clairns in tlw
SEC action, the contemporary law of collateral e~toppelleads
inrscapably to the conclusion that the petitioners are coLlaterally estoppPcl from rPlitigating the question of whethet>
the proxy statcmcJJts were materially false and misleading.

II
The quPstion that remains is whether, notwithstanding the
law of collat<'ral estoppel. the usc of offensive collateral
cstopp('l in this case ·would violn,te the petitioners' Seve11th
Amendment right to a jury trial.~ 0

-----A

"[Tlhc thrust of the [, evcnth] Amendment was to pre...
sc>rvc the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791." Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U. R. 189, 193. At common law, a litigant was
not entitled to have a jury determine issues that had been
previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity. Hopkins v.
Lee, 6 "'heat. 109, 112; Smith v. Kernoche11, 7 How. 198,
217- 218: Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 158-159; Shapiro &
C'oquillctte. The Fetish of Jury Trials in Civil Cases: A ComJu ll i~ true, of rour~e, that !IH' petitioners in the present action would
he Plltttled to :t jur·~· trial of the i~,;up,; hrHrin~ on whether the prox~·
statrnwnt wa..: matc>rially fnl~e H11Cl misleading had the SEC action never
lH·Pn brought-a matter to lw di~eu~:-;<•d in Part IT of thi.s opiniou. But
ilH' prp;-;encr or :tb:-;<>ncc of a jur~' m; fartfimlf'r i~ ba.sil'all~ ' n<'utnd.
lf iiJI<' unlikP. for t•x:tmpl<', tlw IH'!'<'~sJty of defrnding the fir:-;t law:-~uit in an
ineom·rui<·nt forum.
~~~ TIH' Sen·nth AmeiJ(]nwnt pro,·idP:< thnt , "In ~nit::; at rommon law,
wlwrr ihr ,·:tlu<' in <·ontrov('r~y exe<-cd~ t\\enty doiiHr:-~, the right to jury
trial ~hall h<' prel'Pl'\'Cd .•. •"

77-1305-0PINION
PAllKLAl'I.E HOSIERY CO. v. SHORE

11

mcnt on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 448-458
(1!>71).~ 1

Recognition that an equitable determination could have
collateral rstoppel effect in a subsequent legal action was the
major prPmise of this Court's decision in Beacon Thea.tres v.
TT'estover, :350 U. S. 500. In that case the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that certain arrangements between it
and the dPfendant were not in violation of the antitrust laws,
and askrd for an injunction to prevf'nt the defendant from
instituting an antitrust action to challenge the arrangemrnts. The defemlant denied the allegations and couuterclaimcd for treble damages under the antitrust laws, requesting a trial by jury of the issues common to both the legal
and rquitable claims. The Court of Appeals upheld denial
of the rf'quest. but this Court r<'Vct·sed, stating that:
"rT] he effect of the action of the District Court could
be, as tlw Court of Appeals believed. 'to limit the petitioner's opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue
which has a bearing upon it.s treble damage suits,' for
clPtf'rmination of the issttf' of clearances by the judge
might 'operate either by way of res judicata or collateral
cstoppE'l so as to couclude both parties with respect
thereto at the subsequcn t trial of the treble damage
claim.' " 359 U. S., at 504.

It is thus clrar that the Court in lihe Beacon Theatres case
thought that if an issuE' common to both legal and equitable
claims was first determiued by a judge, relitigation of the issue
2 1 The <IH1hor;;: of thi" Artir·l!' roneludt' th11J 1hr h.i,.toriral Hourrt>i:l "indiCiltrd thn1 in !hr late PighfN•n!h c·entul'.'' and f'Hri~· ninet(•puth centuries,
detrrmination:> in rquity wrrc thou~ht to havr H~ murh forcE' a;; determination:- :1 t Ia\\· and that thr pos,iblr impart. on jury trial right::; wa;.; not
viewed with concern. . . . If coll!lteml est.opprl i;; otherwise warrantf'd,
the jm~ · trial que:;twn i<hould not stand in the way." !d., at 455-J.56.
Thi:-: common-law rule i:-: adopted iu thr HC'~tatPmrnt of .Tudg:nwnt,; § ()R,
· Commrnt .J (1!-J-tn .

1
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before a jury might be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral
estoppel. To avoid this result, the Court held that when legal
and equitable claims are .ioined in the same action. the trial
judge has only limiteJ discretion in determining the sequence
of trial and "that discretion ... must, wherever possible. be
exerciseJ to preserve jury trial. " !d., at 510.""
Both the premise of Beacon Theatres, and the fact that it
enunciated no more than a gelleral prudential rule were confirmed by this Court's dPcisio11 in Katchen v. La;ndy, 382 U.S.
323. In that case the C'ourt helJ that a bankruptcy court.
sitting as a statutory court. of equity, is f'mpowereJ to adjudicate equitable claims prior to legal claims without violating
the Seventh Amendment. The Court stated:
"Both Beacon 1'heatrer and Dairy Queen recognized that
there might be situations in which the Court would proceed to resolvf' thf' Pquitable claims first even though the
results might be dispositive of the issues involved in the
legal claim." 382 F. S. , at 339.
Thus thE' Court in Katchen v. Landy, recognized that an
equitablE' determination can have collateral estoppel effect in
a subsequent legal action, and that this estoppel Joes not
violate thr Sl'VE'nth Amendment.

B
Despite the strong support to be found both in history and
in the recent decisional law of this Court for the proposition
that an equitable determination can have collateral estoppel
effect in a subsequent legal action. the petitioners a.rgue that
application of collateral estopp('l in this case would nevertheless violate their Seventh AmE'11dment right to a jury trial.
The petitionrrs contend that since the scope of the Amend22

Similar!~· .

Mee/,:er

Y.

in both Dairy Queen, Inc . v. Wood , 369 U. S. 469, and
Ambassador Oil Corp .. 375 U.S . 160, the Court held that legal

claim;; should ordinarii~ · be tril:'d brforr rquitable rlaims to preserve theright !o a ,iury trial
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ment must be determined by reference to the common law
as it existed in 1791, a11d since the common law permitted
collateral estoppel only where there was mutuality of parties.
collateral estoppel cannot constitutionally be applied when
such mutuality is absent.
The petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason, however, why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should
depend on whether or not mutuality of parties is present. A
litigant who has lost because of adverse factua.l findings iu an
equity actiou is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is
estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same
party or a new party. In either case, the party against whom
estoppel is asserted has litigated questions of fact, and has
had the facts determined against him in all earlier proceeding.
In either case there is no further factfinding function for the
jury to perform, since the common factual issues have been
resolved in the previous action. Cf. Ex parte Peterson, 253
U. R. 300, 310 ("No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by
jury unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to
be determined.").
The Seventh Amendment has ne\'er been interpreted in the
rigid manner advocated by the petitioners. On the contrary,
many procedural devices developed since 1791 that ha.ve
diminished the civil jury's historic domain have been found
not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendmeut. See
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-393 (a directed
verdict does not violate the Seventh Ameudment); Gasol·ine
Products Co. v. Champl1:n Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-498
(retrial limited to question of damages does not violate the
, eventh Amendment even though there was no practice a.t
common law for setting aside a verdict in pa.r t); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. U11ited States, 187 U. S. 315. 319-321 (summary judgment does not violate thr~ Reventh Amendment).~a
a Thr ]lf'titiOJwr~ ' relimwe on Dimick v. Shiedt, 293 U. S. 474, is misphlced . In tlw Dimick ca;;C' thr Comt hrld that. an incrrase by the trial
judf!:e of the nmount of money damage~ awn.rded by the jury violated the
2
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The Galloway casr is particularly instructive. There the·
party against whom a clirC'cted verdict had been entered
argued that the procedure was unconstitutional under the·
Seventh Amendment. I11 rejecting this claim, the Court,
said:
"The Amrndment did not bind the federal courts to the·
Pxact procedural incidf'nts or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, any more than it tied
them to the common-law system of pleading or the·
specific rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were the
rules of the common law thrn prevalent. iJJcluding those
relating to the procedure by which the :judge regulated
thr .1 ury's role on questions of fact, crystallized in a fixed
and immutable system . . . .
"The morr logical conclusion, we think, and the one
which both history and the previous decisions here support. is that the Amendment was designed to preserve the
basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements. not the great mass of procedural forms and
details varying even tlwn so widely among common-law
jurisdictions." 319 U.S., at ~90, 392 (footnote omitted).
The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas defining the scope of the jury's function. has
evolved sinct' 1791. Under the rationale of the Galloway·
case. these developments are not repugnant to the Seventh
Amendment simply for the ff'ason that they did not exist in
1791. Thus if. as we have held. the law of collateral estoppel
forecloses the petitioners from rclitigating the factuai issues
seco11d elause of the• SrVPnth Amendment, whic-h providE>~ that. "no fact
tried b.'· H jnr,,·, ~hall b<> otlH"rwi~e rE--examined in any Court of thP UnitPd'
State~. than arrordin11: to the rule~ of the common law." Collatrral
r~toppPI dof';.; not involve the ''rP-examination" of any fact decidPd by a
jur~·. Ou thl' contrary , tlw whole premi;;e of collateral eJStoppPI i~ that
oncp an i:-;~IH' hns brcn resoh ·ed in a prior proeerding, there is no furtherfaC'tfinding funetion to be pPrformrd .
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determined against them in the SEC action, nothing in the
Seveuth Amendment dictates a different result, even though
because of lack of mutuality there would have been 110 collateral estoppel in 1791. 21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

21

In rraching thi~; conclu~ion, tlw Court of AppE"dls wrnt on to state:·

'"Were there any doubt about the I qur~tion whethrr thr petitioners werrentitled to a jury rPdetermination of the issur~> othC'rwio;c subject to collateral c;;toppriJ it should in any event he rrsolved against the defendants
in thi~ C<ISC for thr reason that, although they were fully aware of the
prndrnry of the present suit throughout the non-jury trial of thr SEC
case, they mndc no effort to prot<'ct thrir right to a jury trial of trw
damage claim~ a~serted b~· plamt iffs, c-i"thrr by seeking to expeditr triaf
of tlw pr~ent nrtion or b~· reqursting .fudgr Duffy, in th<' ('X<'rcise of hit<
discrE>t1on pursuant to Rul(• ag (b), (r) F. R. Civ. P., to ordrr that the
i~~ues in thP SEC cas<' T)(' triPd h~· a jur~· or befon• all ndvisory jury."'
565 F . 2d, at 821. (Footnote omitted .)
Thr Court of Appeal:; wa~ mii-t-aTwn in thes<' ~uggffltions. Thr petitioner~ did not hav(• a right to a jm~· trial in the equitable injunctive H.c tion
hrought. by tlH• SEC'. :VIore0\'('1', an :tcfvi;-;or~· jury, which might h:we onl~
deJ:.t~ '(•d and complH·ated thnt procet•din~, would not in any Pvrnt have
lwrn a SevPnth Amell(hnPnt ,1111')'. And t hl' prtitioner:s were not in a
positwn to expedit(• the pnv11te :t<'twn :llld :,;ta~· the SEC action. The
Srcunt1r~ Aet of 19:3-l provid<•:< for prompt enforcement action:< b~· the
"'E.C u1rehlndrrrd by pa~allef private arlion~. 15 U. S. G. § 78u (g) .
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
It is admittedly difficult to be outra.ged about the treatment accorded by the federal judicia.ry to petitioners' de111and
for a jury trial in this lawsuit. Outrage is an emotion all but
impossible to generate with respect to a corporate qefendant
in a securities fraud action, and this case is no exception.
But the nagging sense of unfairness as to the way petitioners
have been treated, engendered by the imprimatur placed by
the Court of Appeals on respondent's "heads I win, Ut.ils you
lose" theory of this litigation, is not dispelled by this Court's
antiseptic analysis of the issues in the case. It may be that
if this Nation were to adopt a new Constitution today, the
Seventh Amendment guaranteeing the right of jury trial in
civil cases in federal courts would not be included among its
provision~. But any present sentiment to that effect cannot
obscure or dilute our obligation to enforce the Seventh Amendment, which wa.s included in the Bill of Rights in 1791 and
which has not since been repea.Ied in the only manner provided by the Constitution for repeal of its provisions.
The right of trial by jury in civil cases at common law is
fundamental to our history and j1,1risprudence. ·Today, however, the Court reduces this valued right, which Blackstone
praised as "the glory , of English law," to a mere "neutral"
factor and in the natne of procedural reform denies the right
of jury trial to defendants jn a vast number of cases in which
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defendants, heretofore, have enjoyed jury trials. Over 35
years ago, Mr. Justice Black lamented the "gradual process
of judicial erosion which in one-hundred-p_fty years has slowly
worn away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the
Seveuth Amendment." Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S.
372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). Regrettably, the
-erosive process continues apace with today's decision.1

I
The Seventh Amendment provides:
"In Suits at common law, where the value in contmversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be other·
wise reexamined in any Court of tqe United States, than
according to the rules of common law."
The history of the Seyenth Amendment has bee~1 amply documented by this Court and by legal scholars, 2 and it would
serve no useful purpose to attempt here to repeat all that has
been written on the subject. Nonetheless, the decision of
this case turns on the scope and effect of the Seventh Amendment, which, perhaps more than with any other provision of
the Constitution, are determined by reference to the historical
setting in which the Amendment was adopted. See Colgrove
v. Battin, 413 U. S. 149, 152 (1973). It therefore is appro1 Because I believe that the use of offensive collateral rstoppel in this
particular case was improper, it is not nece:;sary for me to decide whether
I would approve its use in circumstances where the defendant's right to
a jury trial was not impaired.
2 S<-1(', e. g., Colgrove v. Batt-in, 413 U. S. 149 (1973); Capital Traction
Co . v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899); Par~Jons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830);
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh A!llendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
289 (1966) (hereinafter "Henderson"); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment , 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (1978) (hereinafter "Wolfram") . Sec also United States v. Woman, 28 F. Cas. 745
(No, 16,750) (C. C. D. Mass. 1812), tStory, Jl.}.
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pr:iate to paU&e to review, albiet briefly, the circumstances
preceding and attending the adoption ·of th~ Seventh Amend·
ment as a guide in ascert~tining iUl application to the case
at hand.
A
It is perhaps easy to forget, now more than 200 ye~trs
removed from the events, that the right of trial by jury Wl:l.S
held in such esteem by th'e colonists that its deprivation ttt
the hands of the English was one of the irpport~tnt grievances
leading to the break with Engl~tnd. . See Sourc~s and Doct~-
ments Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788, at 94
(2d ed. S. Morison 1929); -lt· Pound, Development of ConstF·
tutional Guarantees of Liberty ~9-72 ( 1957) ; C. Ubbelohde,
The Vice-Admir~Jty Courts and the American ltevolution
208-211 (1960). The extensive use of vice-adrnirf\lty courts
by colonial administrator's to eliminate th13 colonists' rigqt
of j m·y trial was listed among the specific offensive E11glish ·
a.cts denounce(J in the Declar~ttion of Independence. a ·And
after war had broken out, all of the ,13 newly formed States
restored. the in!ltitution of civil jury trial to its prior promiI

The Declamti9n of Independence states, "For depriving us, in many
of the Benefit:; of Trial by Jury ." Jui:it two year:s earlier, in the
Declaration of Rights adopted October 14, 1774, th~ first Continental
Congress had unanimously resolved that "the respective Colonies are
entitled to the common law of England, and more e~pecially to the great
and ine:>timable privilege of being tried l;>y their peers of the vicinage,
according to the course of that law." 1 Journals of Congress 28.
Holdsworth has written that of all the new meth~ds adopted to
strengthen the administration of the Hr)tish laws, "the most effective, and
therefm·e the most disliked, was the extension given to tJu; jurisdiction of
the reorganized courts of admiralty and vice-admiralt~' · It was the most
effective, because it deprived the dPfendant of the right to be tried by a
jury which was almost certain pot. to convict him." XI Holdsworth, A
History of English Law 110 (7th ed. 1956). While thf> vice-admiralty
•.·cmrts dealt chiefly with criminal offenses, their jurisdiction also was
~lxtended to many areas of the civil law. Wolfram, suprq, n. 2, at '65t
8

Ca~es,

·n. 41•

.

,:~
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nence; 10 expressly guaranteed the right in their state constitutiolls and the 3 other~ recognized it by statute or by
common practice. 4 Indeed, "[t]he right to trial by jury wag
probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions ...." L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression-Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 281 0960). 5
One migpt justly wonder then why no mention of the right
of jury trial in civil cases should have found its way into the
Constitution that emerged from the Phil!Vlelphia convention
in 1787. Article III, § 3 merely ' provide~ that "the trial of
all crit~es, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury."
The omission of a clause protective of the civil jury right
was not for lack of trying, however. Messrs. Pinckney and
Gerry proposed to provide a clause securing the right of jury
trial in civil cases, but their efforts fjtileq. 6 Several reasons
have been advanced for this failure. The Federali~ts argued
that the pra,ct.ice of civil juries among the several States
1

4 Ga . Con;;t. of 1777, Art. LXI, in 2 The l<'ederal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other O,rganic L~ws 785 (F. Thorpe ed ..
1909); Md. Canst. of 1776, Art. III, in 3 id., at 1686-1687; Mass. Const.
of 1780, Art. XV, in 3 id., at 1891-1892; N. H. Const. of 1784, Art XX,.
in 4 id., at 2456; N. J. Const. of 1776, Art. XXII, in 5 id., at 2598;
N. Y. Const. of 1777, Art. XLI, in 5 id., at 2637; N. C. Const. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, Art. XIV, in 5 id., at 2788; fa. Const. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, Art;. XI, in 5 id., at B083; S. C. Canst. of 1778.
Art. XLI, in 6 id., at 3257; Va. Canst. of 1776, Bill of Ri~hts, § 11, in
'd id., at 3814. See Wolfram, supra, n. 2, at 655.
~When Congress in 1787 adopted the Northwest Ordinance for goverl).ance of the territorii's west of the Appalachians, it included u gtJurantee·
of trial by jury i11 civit cases. 2 The Federal and State Constitutions,
·Colonial Charter:::, and Other Organic Laws 960-961 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) ..
~The propoi:illl was to add the following language to Art. III: "And a
trial by jury shall be preserved a;; usual in civil cases." 2 M . Farrand,
Records of the Federal Convpntion 628 ( 1911). The debate regardit1g:
\ltis proposal is quoted in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S., at 153-151>, 11, 8~
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varied so much that it was too difficult to draft constitutional
language to accommodate the different state pr~tCtices. See
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S., at 153. 7 Whatever the reason
for the omission, however, it is clear that even before the
delegates had left Philadelphia, plans were under way to
attack the proposed Constitution on the ground that it failed
to contain a guarantee of civil jury trial in the new federal
courts. SeeR. Rutland, George Mason 91 (1961); Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
Minn. L. Rev. 639, 662 (1973) .
The virtually complete absence of a bill of rights in the
proposed Constitution was the principal focus of the Anti~
Federalist attack on the Constitution, and the lack of a provision for civil juries featured pro~inently in their arguments. See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 43.'3, 445 ( 1830).
'Their pleas struck a responsive chord in the popqlace and the
price exacted in many States for approv~ of the Constitution
was the appending of a list of recommended amendments,
chief among them a clause securing the right · of jury tria1
in civil cases. 8 Responding to the pressures for a civil jury
guarantee generated during the ratification debates, the first
The ohjPction of Mr. Gorham of Massachusetts was tha.t "[t]he con~
stitution of .rurie8 is different in different States and the trial itself is
usual in different ca:,;es in different Sta.tes." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the
Federal Convention 628 ( 1911) . Commentators have suggested several
additional reasons for the failure of the convention to include a civil jury
guarantee. See Henderson, s·upra, n. 21 at '294-295; ("true reason for
omitting a similar provision for civil juries was at least in part that the
convention member:; simply wanted to go home."); Wolfram, supm, 11. 2,
nt 660-666.
'
8 See Himderoon, supm, n. 2, at 298; Wolfram, supm, 11. 2, at 667-703,
Virginia's recommended jury trial amendment is typical: "That, in controversies respecting property, u.nd in suits between man a~1d man, the
nncient trial by jury is one of the greatest securities to the rights of the
people, and [ought] to remain &'lcred and inviolable." 3 .T. Elliot, T11e
Debates in the Several 'State Convention~, on the Adoption of the F'eden),l
''Constitj.ttion 658 (2d t:>d. 1836) .
1
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Congress under the new Constitution at its fir!)t session in
1789 proposed to amend the Constitution by adqing the following language: "In suits at common law, between man and
man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the
rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." 1 Annals
of Cong. 424, 435 (178n). 'fhat provision, altered in language
to what became the Seventh Amendment, was proposed by
the Congress in 1789 to the legislatures of the several States
and became effective with its · ratification by Virginia on
December 15, 1791.9
1"he foregoing sketch is meant to suggest what many of
those who oppose the use of juries in civil trials seem to ignore. The founders of our N at1on considered the right of trial
by jury in civil cases an imp01·tant bulwark against tyranny
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to qe left to the
whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the
judiciary.19 Those who passi01iately advocated the right to a
(livi] jury trial did not do so because they considered the jury
a familiar procedural device that should. be continued; the
concerns for the institutioH of jury trial th"'t led to the pas..
sages of the Declaration oi lndepenclence and to the Seventh
Amendment were not animated by a belief that use of juries
would lead to more efficient judicial administration. Trial
by a jury of layman rather than by the sovereign's judges
was important to the founders because juries represent the
layman's commonsense. the "passional elements in our nature,"
·~nd thus keep the administration of law in accord with
'the wishes and feelings of the community. 0. W. Holmes,
9 The Judichtry Ac't of September 24, 1789, which was passrd within six
months of the organization of the new government and on the day before
t,he fir~t 10 amendments were proposed to the legislatures of the States by
the First Congress, provided for a civil jury trial right. 1 Stat. 77 ( 1789) .
10 Thomas Jefferson stated, "I consider trial by jury ltS the only anchor
yet imagined by man, by which a. governmt>nt can be held to the principles
·'Qf its coqstit~~tiol) .~' 3 Writi~s of Thou;w,s Jeffer,13on (Washington ed.) 71~
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believed that a jury would reach a result th~t a judge eith_er
" - collected Legal Papers 237 C19~i). Those who fa-;ored juries
could not or would not reach. 11 It is with these values that
underlie the Seventh Amendrpent in mind that the Court
should, but obviously does not, approach the decision of this

f"

case.
B
The Seventh Amendment requires tha.t the right of trial
by jury be "preserved." Becttu~ the Seventh Amendment
demands preservation of the j'[lry trial right, our cases have
uniformly held that the content of the right must be judged
by historical standards. E. g., Curtis v. Lo(Jther, 415 U. S.
189, 193 (1974); Colgrove v. Batti·n, '4:13 U. S. 149, 155-156
(1973); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); Capital
1.'ra.ction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1899); Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). Thus. in Baltimore & Caroline Line, Inc. v. Redma:n, 295 U. S. 654, 657
(1935), the Court stated that "[t]he right of trial. by jury
thus preserved is the right which existed under the English
common law when the Amendment was adopted." And in
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474. 476 (1935), the Court held,
urn order to ascertain the scope and mefining of the Seventh
Amendment, resort must be had to the a.ppropria.t e rules of
the common law established at tbe time of the adoption of
tt Wolfram, supra, n. 2, at 671. Professor Wolfram has written:
" [T]he antifederalists w~>re not arguing, for the institution of civil jury
irial in the bE>Iief that jury trial~ were short, inexpensive, decorous and
JJroductive of the same decisions that judges sitting without, juries wouhf
produce. The inconveniences of jury trial were accepted precisely because
in important instances, through its ability to disregard substantive rules
of law, the jury would reach a rrsnlt tllat the judge eithrr could not or
would not reach. Tho~c who favored· the civil jury were not misguide<f
tinkererH with procedural devices; they were, for the day, libertarians who
avowed that important areas of protection for litigants in general, and for
aebtors in particular, would be placed ill grave danger unless it werer.eqpllliaed that i(I,Ul'ies sit in civil cases."· 5711\{iinn. JL .. Rev., at 67.1-&7.2:,.

.....:.

,.}
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that constitutional provision in 1791." 12 If a jury would have
been impaneled in a particula.r kind of case in 1791, then the
Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial today, if either
party so desires.
To be sure, it is the substance of the right of jury trial
that is preserved, not the incidental or collateral effects of
common-law practice in 1791. Walker v. New Mexico &
S. P. R. Co., 165 ,U. S. 593, 596 (1897). "The aim of the
Amendment, as this Court has held, is to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure, and particularly to retain· the common-law distinction between the
province of the court and that of the jury... ." Baltirnore &
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redrnan, 295 U. 8., at 657. Accord,
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S., at 156-157; Gasoline Products
Co. v. Charnplin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 498 (1931);
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920). "The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact procedural
incidents or details of jury trial according to the commO!l law
of 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing." Galloway v. United States, 319 U. 8. 372, 390 (1943).
To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal
courts to the exact procedure of the common law in 1791 does
not imply, however, that any nominally "procedural" ch~nge
can be implemented, regard.Jess of its impact on the functions of the jury. For to sanction creation of procedural
devices which limit the province . of the jury to a greater
degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct
12

The majority suggests that Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), is
11ot relevant to the decision in this case because it deaJt with the second
clause of the Seventh Amendment. Ante, at 13-14, n. 23. I disagree.
T here is no intimation in that opinion that the first clause should be
treated any differently than the second. The Dimick Court's respect for
the guarantees of the Seventh Am-end.m ent applies equally to the first
tiao..se ~ tQ the second.

'

.
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contravention of the 's eventh Amendment. See Neely v.
Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967);
Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S., at 395; Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U. S., at 487; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S., at
309-310. And since we deal here not with the common law
qua common law but with the Constitution, no amount pf
argument that the device provides for more efficiency or more
a.ccuracy or is fairer will save i~ if the degree of invasiol) of the
jury's province is gre;tter than allowed in 1791. To rule
otherwise would effectively :permit judicial repeal of the
Seventh Amendment beca.use l)early any change in the province of the jury, no matter how qrastic the diminution of its
functions; can always be demoninateq 11 procedurttl reform."
The guarantees of the Seventh Amendment will prove burdensome in some instances; the civil jury surely was a burden
to the English governors wh<!>, in its stead, substituted the
vice-;tdm!ra.Ity court. But, as with other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the onerous nature of the protection is no
license for contracting the rights secured by the Amendment.
Because "[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body
is of such importance and occupies so firm · a place in our
history and jurisprudence . .. any Sei'Jming curtailment of
the right to a jury trial should be serutini21ed with the utmost
care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S., at 486, quqted in Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 501 (195Q) .
I

c
Judged by the foregoing principles, I think it is clear that
petitioners were denied their Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in this case. Neither respondents nor the Court
doubt that at common law as it existed in 1791, petitioners
would have been entitled in the private action to have a jury
determine whether the proxy statement was false and m~s
leading in the respects alleged. The reason is that at common
la.w in 1791, collateral estoppel was permitted only where t}le
.

I

I

'

..

'

77-1305-DISSENT

10

PARKLANE HOSIERY CO. v. SHORE

parties in thE' first action w,ere identical to, or in privity with,
the parties to the subsequent action.13 It was ~1ot until 1971
that the doctrine of mutuality was abrogated by this Court
in certain limited circums~ances. Blonder-Tongue LaborO;tories, Inc. v. Univ~rsity o/lllinois' Foundation, 402 ~J. S. 313
(1971). 14 But developments in the · judge-made doctrine of
collateral estoppel, however s~utary, cannot. consistent with
the Seventh Amendment, contract in any material fashion the
right to a jury trial that a defetldant would have enjoyed in
1791. In the instant case. resort to the doctrine of collateral
estoppel does more than merely contract the right to a jury
trial: It eliminates the right e11tirely and therefore contra.~
venes the Sevetith Amendment.
'l'he Court responds, however, that at common law "a litigant was not entitled to have a jury [in a Sl.lbsequent fWtion
at law between the same part~es] determine issues that had
been previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity," and
that "petitioners have advanced no persuasive reason ... why
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment shol.lld depend on
whether or not mutuality of parties is present." Ante, at 10,
13. But that is tantamount to saying that since ' a pa.r ty
would not be e11titled to a jury trial if he bl'Ought an equitable
·action, there is no persuasive rf)ason why he should receive a
jury trial on virtually the same issues if instead he chooses
to bring his lawsuit in the nature of a 1ega1 action. ·•rhe pev...
1

See Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 218 (1849); 1/opk:ins v. Lee,
6 Wheai . 109, 118-114 (1820; F. Buller, An Introduction to the Law
Relative to Trial~ at Ni~i Prillil 2:32 (1806); T. Peake, A Compendium of
the Law of Evidence :38 (2d ed. 1804).
1 '1 The Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Fuundation, 402 U. S. ' :313 (1971), is, on its facts , limited
to th€' def€'nsive use of collateral estoppel in patent cases. Abandonment
of mutuality is a recellt development. The case of Bm'rlhard v. Bank of
A,rnerica Nat. 'l'ntst (~ Sav. Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P. 2d 892 (1942),
·genmally considered the seminal case <i<loptir~ ·t:he new App1·oach, was~
dec\ded nntil 194-2•
13

•••.
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suasive reason is that the Seventh Amendment requires that
a party's right to jury trial which existed at common law be
"preserved" from incursions by the government or the judiciary. Whether this Court believes that use of a jury trial
in a particular instance is necessary, or fair or repetitive is
simply irrelevant. If that 'view is "rigid," it is the Constitu..
tion which commands that ·rigidity. To hold otherwise is to
rewrite the Seventh Amendment so that a party is guara:pteed
a jury trial in civil cases unless!this Court thinks that a j4I'Y
trh1J would be inappropriate.
No doubt parallel "procedural reforms" could be instituted
in the area, of crimina.I jurisprudence, which would accomplish
nmch the same sort of expedition of court calendars and conservation of j udicia.I resources I¥J would the .extension of col. lateral estoppel in civil litigation. Government motions for
summary judgment, or for a directed verdict in fttvor of the
prosecution at the close of the evidence, WOl.lld presumably
save countless hours or judges' and jurors' time. It can
sca.rcely be doubted, though, that such "procedural reforms"
would not survive constitutional scrutiny under the j}lrY trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. Just as the principle ot
sepjlration of powers was not incorporated by the Framers
into the Constitution in order to promote efficiency or dispatch in the business of government, the right to a jury thai
was not guaranteed in order to facilitate prompt and accurate
decision of lawsuits. The essence of that right lies in its
insistence that a body of laymen not permanently attached
to the sovereign participate along with the judge in the factfinding necessitated by a lawsuit. And that essence is as
much a part 'of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee in civil
cases as it is of the Sixth Amendmept's guarantee in criminal
prosecutions. Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217,
220 (1946) .
Relying on Galloway v. United States, ~vupra, Gasol·ine
Products Co. v. Champlin Refinery Co., supra, and Fidelit1F&:
I
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Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902), the Court
seems to suggest that the offen.sive use of collateral estoppel
in this ca::;e is permissible ijnqer the limited principle set forth
above that a mere procedural · change that does not invade
the province of the jury' and a defendant's right thereto to a
gre11ter extent than authorized by the cOinmon law is permis·
. sible. But the Court's actions today constitute a far greater
infringerpent of the defendant's rights than it ever before has
sanctioned. In Galloway, the Court upheld the modern form
of directed verdict against a Seventh Amendment challenge,
but it is clear that a similar form of directed verdict existed at
common law in 1791. E. g., Beauchqmp v. Bo'r'l'et, Peake 148,
170 Eng. Rep. 110 (K. B. 1792); Coupey v. Henley, 2 Esp.
540, 542, 170 Eng.ltep. 448, 449 (C. P. 1797).15 The modern
form did not materia.lly alter the function of the jury. SinJ.ilarly, the modern device of summary judgment was found
not to violate the Seventh Amendment because in 1791 a
demurrer to the evidence, a procedurjl] device substantially
similar to summary juqgment,' was a common pn1,ctice. E. g.,
Pawling v. United Stq.tes, 4 Cranch. 219, 221-222 (1808).w
'fhe procedural devices of summary judgment aud directed
verdict are direct descendauts of their eommon-law antecedents. They accomplish nothing more than could have been
done at common law, albeit by a more cumbersome procedure.
15

See Henderson, supm, n. 2, at 302-303 ("In the England of 1790 the
phrase 'to dirE:'ct a verdict' wa::; common. Further, it wa::; commonplace to
instn~ct the jtii'Y 'that. the plaintiff was entitlE'd to rE:'cover,' or 'the plaintiff
must lw.ve a verdict.:'"); Scott, Trinl by Jury ana the Reform of Civil
Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 667, 686 (1918) (cases cited therein). '
16 To dE:'mur, a party would aqmit the truth of all the fliCt<~ adcl11Ced
against hnn and every adverse inferenpe that could be dmwn therefrom,
nnd the eourt would determine which party should receive judgment on
the ba:sis of thE:'se admitted facts and inferences. See Slocum v. New York
.Life lm. Co., 228 U. S. 364, 388 (1913); Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. BJ. 187,
12fi Eng. HPp. 4{)9 (H. L. 1793); Henderson, supra, n. 2, a.t 304-305;
Scott, Trial By .Jnry and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv. L. Rev,
! 683-684 (1918).
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See also Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243,
250 (1940) . And while at common law there apparently was
no pq:wtice of setting aside a verdict in part, 17 the Court in
Gasoline Products permitted a partial retrial of "distinct and
separable" issues because the change in procedure would not
impair the substance of the right to jury trial. 283 U. S., at
498. The parties in Gasoline Products still enjoyed the right
to have a jury determine all issues of fact.
By contrast, the development of nomnutual estoppel is a
substantial departure from the common law and its use in
this case completely deprives petitioners of their right to have
a jury determine contested issues of fact. I am simply
unwilling to accept the Court's presumption that the compleoo
extinguishment of petitioners' right to trial by jury can be
justified as a mere change in "procedural incident or detail."
Over 40 years ago, Mr. Justice Sutherland observed in a not
disimilar case, "[T]his court in a very special sense is cha.rged
with the duty of construing and upholding the Constitution;
and in the discharge of that irpportant duty, it ever must be
alert to see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere
analogy to a different case if the result will be to weaken or
subvert what it conceives to be a principle of the funqarrental
law of the land." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S., at 485.

II
Even accepting, arguendo, the majority's position that ther~
is no violation of the Seventh Amendment here, I nonetheless
would not sanction the use of collateral estoppel in this case.
The Court today holds:
uThe general rule should be that in c~es where a plaintiff
11
The Court in Gasoline Product.~ quoted Lord Mansfield, who stated
thttt when a. verdict is correct as to one issue but. erroneous as to another
" ... for form's sake, we must set a~ide the whole verdict .. ." Edie v.
'East India Co., 1 W. Bl. 295, 298, quoted in Gasoline Ptoducts Co. v.
Champli1~ Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494,498 (1931).

'
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could easily have joined in the earlier action or where,
either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons.
the application of offensive co11ateral estoppel would be
tmfair to a defendant. a trial judge should not allow the
use of offensive collateral estoppel." Ante, at 9.

In my view, it is "unfair" to apply offensive collateral
estoppel where the party who is sought to be estopped has not
had an opportunity to have the facts of his case determined
by a jury. Since in this case petitioners were not entitled to
a jury trial in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
lawsuit,, • I would not estop them from relitiga.t iug the issues
dcterntined in the SEC suit befo1·e a jury in the private
actiou. I believe that several factors militate in favor of this
result.
First. the use of offensive col1ateral estoppel in this case
runs counter to the strong federal policy favoring jury trials,
even if it does not. as the majority's holds. violate the Seventh
Amendment. The Court's decision in Beacon Thea.tres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 ( 1959), exemplifies that policy. In
Beacon Theatres the Court held that where both equitable
and legal claims or defenses are presented in a single case,
"only under the most imperative circumstances. circumstance~
which iu view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules
we cannot now anticipate. can the right to a jury trial of legal
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."
!d. , at .51~51V" Alld in Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752,
I agrt'<' with the Court ihat "petitioners did not have a right to a
triul iu the equitable injunctive action brolight by the SEC." Ante,
•tt 15 11 . 24.
1.8

jur~'

tu

Meekn v. Ambassador Oil Corp., 375 U.S. 160 (1963) (per curiarn),

i;; a, casE' wh!'re the doctrine of collateral estoppE>l ~· ielded to the right to
n jur~ trial. In Meeker, plnintiff~ a:sserted both l.'qnitable and !l.'gnl claimf-,
winch prrsentt>d common i~sue:s, and cll'manded a jury trinl. The trial
eourt tried the equitable claim first, and decided that claim, and the
common issues, adversPly to plaintiffs. As a re:mlt, it. hl•ld tllnt plnintiffs
·were prcclqded itom .rrlitiga tlng thOllc same 1ssncs before a jury on their
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752--753 (1942), the Court stated, "The right of jury trial in
civil cases at common law is a basic and fqndamental feature
of our system of federal jurisprude.pce which is protected by
the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred
to the citizen, whether guaranteed by yhe Constitution or
provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the
courts." Accord. Simler v. Conner, 372 U. S. 2.2~, 222 ( 1963);
Byrd v. Blue Ridy~ Rural Electric Copperative,.Inc., 356 U. S.
525, 537-539 (1958) (strong federal policy in favor of juries
requires jury trials in diversity cases, l'eganfless of state
practice). Today's decision will mean that iu a large number
of private cases defendants will no longer enjoy the right to
jury tl'iaV 0 Neither the Court nor respondent have adverted
or cited to any unmanageable problems }hat have resulted
from according defendants jury trials in sqch cases. I simply
see no "imperative circumstances" requ~ring this wholesale
abrogation of jury trials,21
legal claim. 308 :F. 2d 875, 884 (CAIO 1962). Pli1intiffs appeil)ed, alleging
a denial of their right to a jury trial, but. the Tenth Circuit affirmed tlle
trial court. This Court revet:>ed t:lw Court of Appeals on the b asis of
Beacon Theatres, lnc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 (1959) ~nd Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469 (1962), even though, unlike those·
cases, the equitable action in Meeke1· already Ifid been tried and the
common issue':> dl't.erlnined by the court. Thus, even though the plaintiffs
in M eekm· had received a "full and fair" opportu~ity to try tpe common
issues in the prior equitable action, they no~et.heless .were given the
opportunity to retry those issues before a jury. Today's qecision is totally
incon::;istent with Meeker nnd the Court fails to explain this inconsiste1~cy•.
·20 The Court's decision today may well extend to other areas, such as
antitrust, labor, employment discrimination, consumer protection apcl the
like, where ll private pla.intjff may sue for damages based on the same or
similar violations that are the subject of governmept actions.
21 Thi~ is not to say that Congress cannot COIJ1mit. el\forcemeut of
stat utorily crea.ted rights to an' "administrative process or special~zed court
of equity." Curtis v. Luethe1·, 415 U. S. 189, 195 (1~74);
see Atlas
I
Roofing Co., lnc. v. Occupational Safety Comrri'n, 430 U . .S. 442 (1977);
Katchen v. !.andy, 382 U. S. j323 (1966); N.Ll(,B v. .Jones & Laughlin SteeL
1

'

'

I

'Corp., 301 U, S. 1 (1937) .
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Second, 1 believe that the opportunity for a ju-ry trial in the
second action could easily lead to a different result from that
obtained in the first action before the court and therefore that
it is unfair to estop the petitioners from relitigating the issues
before ~ jury. This is the position ttdopted in the Restate~
ment (Second) of Judgments, which d~sa.pproves of the iJ..pplication of offensive bollateral estoppel where the defendant has
an opportunity for a jury trial in the second lawsuit th~t was
not available in tpe first action. 22 The Court accepts the
proposition tha.t it is unfair to apply offensive collateral
estoppel "where the second action affords the defendant
procedural opport~nities unavailable in the first action that
could easily cause a different result." Ante, at 8. Differences
in discovery opportunities between tqe two actions are cited
as e:l!;amples of situations where it would be unfair to permit
offensive collateral estoppel. ld., n. 15. But in thE> Court's
view, the fact that petitioners would have been entitled to a
Jury trial in the present action is 110t such a ' 1procedural
opportunit[y]" because "the presence of absence of a jury as
factfinde~ is basically neutral, quite unlike, for example, the
necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconveniel1t
for11m ." /d., at 10 n. 10 (emphasis added).
As is evident from the prior brief discussion of the deyelop.ment of the civil )ury trial guarantee iu this country, those
who drafted the Declaration of Independence and debated so
passionately the proposed Constitution during the ratification
period, would indeed be astounded to leam that the presence
or absence of a jury is merely "neutral," whereas the availability of discovery~ a device upmentioned in the Constitqtiol1,
He:;tatemenf, (Second) of Judgments § 88 (2), Comment d, p. 92
(Tent. Draft No. 2 1975). Citing Rachal v. Hill, 435 ~. 2d 59 (CA5
1970) , ct·rt. denied, 403 ·u. S. 904 ( 1971), the Reporter's Note state;;, "The
differences between the procedureR available in the first apd second actions,
while not sufficient to deny i::-;sue preclusion between the same p&rties, may
warrant a refusal to carry over preclv~ion to -.J.D action involving anothel'
party." .!d., at lOU.
22

'
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may be controlling. It is precisely because the Framers
believed that they would receive a different result at the
hands of a jury of their peers than at the mercy of the
sovereign's judges, that the Seventh Amendment was adopted.
And I suspect that anyone who litigates cnses before juries in
the 1970's would be equally amazed to heat• of the supposed
lack of distinction between trial by court and trial by jury.
The Court can cite no a.uthority in support of this curious
proposition. The merits of civil juries have been long debated, but I suspect that they have never been accused of
being merely "neutra,l'' factors.:~H
Contrary to the majority's supposition, juries can make a.
difference, and our cases have, before today at least. recognized this obvious fact. Thus, in Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U. S. , at 157, we stated that "the purpose of the jury trial
in .. . civil cases [is] to assure a fair and equitable resolt.Jtion of factual issues, Gasoline Products Co. v. Charnplin Co.,
283 U. S. 494, 498 (1931) . . . . " And in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
R ·ural Electrical Cooperative, Inc., 356 U. S., at 537, the
Court conceded that "the nature of the tribuQal which tries
issues may be importa.n t in the enforcement of the parcel of
rights making up a cause of action or defense . . . . It may
well be that in the instant perSQnal-injury case the outcome
would be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury." See Curtis v. Loether,
415 U. S., at 198; cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156
(1968). Jprors bring to a case their commonsense and comSee, e. g., Hearings on Recording of Jury De~iberations before the
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act of the Senate Committee on the .Tudicia.I'Y, 84th Cong., 1st Se~;s,, 63-81
(1955) (thorough ~ummary of arguments pro and con on jury trials and
nn extensive bibliography) ; H. Kalven & H;. Zeisel, The American .Jury 4,
n 2 (1966) (bibliography) ; Redish, Sevt>nth Amendment. Right to Jury
Trial : A Stud:y in the Irrationa 1ity of Rational Deci~ion Making, 70 Nw.
F L. Rev 486, SD2-50& (1975) (di;;ou;;siou of arguments for and agujnst
j,urles),
28
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munity's values; their "very inexperience is ~tn asset because
it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye." H. Kalven & H. Zeisel,
The American Jury 8 (1966).
The ultimate irony of today's dE>cision i~ that its potential
for significantly conserving the resources of either the litigants
or the judiciary is doubtful at best. That being the case, I
see absolutely no reason to frustrate so cavalierly the important 'federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact
qqestions. The instant case is an &oPt example of the minimal
savings that will be accomplished by the Court's decision. ~s
the Court admits, even if petitioners are collaterally estopped
from relitigating whether the proxy was materially false and
misleading, they are still entitled to have a jury determine
whether respondents were injured by the alleged misstatements and the amount of damages, if any, sustained by
respondents. Ante, at 2 n. 2. Thus, a jury must be impaneled in this case in any event. The time saved by not
trying tl\e issue of whether the proxy was materially false
and misleading before the jury is likely to be insubstantiaJ.2•
It is just as probable that today's decision will have the result
of coercing defendl¥lts to agree to consent orders or settlements in agency enforcement action in order to preserve their
right to jury trial in the private actions. In that event, the
Court, for no compelling reason, will h~tve simply added a
powerful club to the administrative agencies' &.rsenals that
even Congress was unwilling to provide them,

2 ' Much of the delay in jury trial::; is attributed to the jury selection,
v mr dire and the charge. See H. Zeisel, H . Kalvt-n, & B. Buchholtz, Delay
111 the Court 79 (1959) . None of these delaying factors will be avoided by
t.oday's decision,

<!fonri of tfrt ~ b j\bt!
J'MJringhttt. ~. <ij. 20c?'l-~
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CHAMBf:RS

January 3, 1979

THE CHIEf' .JUSTICE

Re:

77-1305 - Park Lane Hosiery Company v. Shore

Dear Potter:
I have meditated to try to capture Bill's appeal to
Hughes' "brooding spirit of the law" but it eluded me. I,
therefore, join you.

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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